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DOES CRIMINAL DIVERSION CONTRIBUTE TO THE
VANISHING CIVIL TRIAL?
John B. Meixner* and Shari Seidman Diamond**
INTRODUCTION
Professor Marc Galanter's seminal piece, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts,1 has had a profound impact on public and scholarly discourse
about the role of the trial in litigation.2 Professor Galanter's work was
the first to document the dramatic national downfall of the American
trial,3 reporting a reduction in the rate of civil cases proceeding to trial
in the federal courts from 11.5% in 1962 to only 1.8% in 2002. 4 In
addition to the precipitous general decline in both the raw number of
civil trials and the rate of civil trials (i.e., the percentage of civil cases
that reach trial), Galanter reported a reduced number and proportion
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law; Ph.D. Candidate, Psychology,
Northwestern University; B.S., University of Michigan, 2006.
** Howard J. Trienens Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Research
Professor, American Bar Foundation. We are extremely grateful to Joe Cecil and George Cort
of the U.S. Federal Judicial Center, who provided us with access to caseload data and extensive
help in interpreting those data.
1. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Fed-
eral and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
2. For example, a preview of the results was published on the front page of the New York
Times on December 14, 2003. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, But Fewer Ever Get to
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at 1; see also ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERI-
CAN TRIAL 2 (2009).
3. Others had reported pockets of evidence indicating reduced trial rates in American court-
rooms before Galanter's 2004 piece. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a
System of Private Litigation, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 189 tbl.6 (documenting a reduction in
the number of jury trials in Cook County, Illinois between 1959 and 1979); Samuel R. Gross &
Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 1-3 (1996) (discussing possible reasons for increased settlement in civil trials); Kent D.
Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the American Civil Jury, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1935, 1936-37
(1997) ("[S]igns of decline [of the jury trial] are all around us... [tihe number of civil jury trials
is indeed becoming insignificant."). However, Galanter's work was the first to systematically
examine on a national scale a wide variety of variables related to trial rates, such as the type of
dispute (e.g., torts, contracts), the length and complexity of trials, the number and type of civil
filings, and criminal trial rates. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 460-98. His comprehensive re-
search became the primary catalyst for immense academic discourse on the subject. See infra
note 9 and accompanying text.
4. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 461.
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of federal criminal trials, 5 a shift from traditional contract and tort
trials toward civil rights trials and prisoner claims, 6 an increase in the
number of long and complex trials, 7 and an increase in the amount of
pretrial adjudication by the court (primarily summary judgment).8
Perhaps most importantly, Professor Galanter's work brought the is-
sue of the vanishing trial into the academic spotlight, triggering a bevy
of symposia and follow-up work that have all reinforced the same
common thesis: the civil trial is disappearing, and disappearing fast.9
While there is little remaining doubt that the American civil trial is
an increasingly scarce commodity, there is still much debate as to what
has caused the decline. Professor Galanter and the scholars who have
followed him have identified a long list of possible explanations. We
will group these possible explanations into two broad categories: "de-
mand" explanations, which focus on reductions in the incentives and
desires of the litigants to proceed to trial, and "supply" or "capacity"
explanations, which focus on the resources of the legal system and its
ability to handle trials.10
5. Id. at 492-94.
6. Id. at 468-73.
7. Id. at 477-81.
8. Id. at 481-84.
9. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Vanishing Trial, Vanishing Community? The Potential Ef-
fect of the Vanishing Trial on America's Social Capital, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 165; Lisa Blomgren
Bingham, When We Hold No Truths to Be Self-Evident: Truth, Belief Trust, and the Decline in
Trials, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 131; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 689 (2004); Christopher Honeyman, Worlds in a Small Room, 2006 J.
Disp RESOL. 107; John W. Keker, The Advent of the "Vanishing Trial": Why Trials Matter, THE
CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 32; Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State
Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755 (2004); Martin H. Redish, Summary Judg-
ment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330
(2005); Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puz-
zles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783 (2004); Margo
Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know About American Trial Trends, 2006 J.
DisP. RESOL. 35; Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica Bina, Puzzles About Supply-Side Explana-
tions for Vanishing Trials: A New Look at Fundamentals, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637
(2004); Frederic N. Smalkin & Frederic N.C. Smalkin, The Market for Justice, the "Litigation
Explosion," and the "Verdict Bubble": A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials, 1 FED. CTs. L. REV.
417 (2006). But see John Lande, Replace "The Vanishing Trial" with More Helpful Myths, 23
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 161 (2005) (characterizing the vanishing trial as a "myth"
in that "accounts of the impending demise of the trial are exaggerated").
10. See Diamond & Bina, supra note 9, at 638; see also Galanter, supra note 1, at 500, 516-22.
We characterize effects as "demand" effects based on whether there is a demand from.the par-
ties to move to trial. That is, if parties choose to settle before trial or use a method of alternative
dispute resolution, the corresponding reduction in trial rate comes because there is no demand
for the trial-the parties have decided to end litigation. We characterize capacity problems
within the judicial system as "supply" effects because these theories propose that courts are not
able to meet the supply of cases moving toward trial due to a lack of resources. The two, of
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These proposed explanations are varied and include: a general re-
duction of the number of filings in trial courts,1" an increased reliance
on alternative dispute resolution,12 increased costs of proceeding to
trial due to the increased use of expert witnesses and specialized lawy-
ering,13 changes in the law of summary judgment that increased the
burden the nonmoving party must bear to fend off judgment on the
motion,14 and a skewed perception of the risk of "out of control" ju-
ries and difficulty in predicting the outcome of trials. 15 Many scholars
have suggested that each of these explanations has likely played (and
will continue to play) at least some limited role in the reduction of
civil trials.' 6
Supply-side explanations have received more skepticism than de-
mand-side explanations from the academic community. One supply-
side hypothesis often suggested, based on claims by judges and attor-
neys, is that courts simply lack the resources, whether in terms of the
raw number of judges or in terms of their time and resources, to con-
duct trials.17 Professor Galanter dismissed this hypothesis on the basis
that "with fewer judges ... and far less money, the federal courts 20
years ago were conducting more than twice as many civil trials."18 We
note, however, that while there were fewer judicial resources and
more civil trials in the 1980s, the increase in judicial resources has not
kept pace with the increase in filings, suggesting that constraints on
course, are not independent: a party may "prefer" settlement in part in order to avoid having to
wait for a trial date, so that settlement can in fact be a response to a problem of supply.
11. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 516. Professor Galanter noted that this explanation is un-
likely a major factor in the reduction of federal trials, as the filing rate has remained relatively
steady for the past twenty years. Id. Professor Galanter noted, however, that the number of
filings have declined in state courts, though not at the same rate as the number of trials. [d.
12. Id. at 517. Professor Galanter noted that this explanation is also unlikely to account for
much of the decline in trials, as the decline seems ubiquitous across jurisdictions and ADR is not
popular enough to be driving the effect. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) ("When
the moving party has carried its burden ... its opponent must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."); see also Redish, supra note 9, at
1330 & n.5.
15. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57
STAN. L. REv. 1255, 1263 (2005); Galanter, supra note 1, at 517-18.
16. See Diamond & Bina, supra note 9, at 638; Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006
J. Disp. RESOL. 7, 23-33 (suggesting broad theories of the vanishing trial that incorporate many
of these more discrete possible explanations).
17. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 1, at 519.
18. Id.
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judicial resources may in fact be contributing to the disappearance of
the trial.19
Other possible supply-side causes of reduced trial rates are reduc-
tions in the number of experienced trial lawyers-resulting in an "at-
rophy of advocacy skills" and presumably reduced comfort with the
thought of going to trial2 0-and changes in the role that judges view
themselves as playing, from being a more passive provider of trials to
being an active resolver of disputes.21
One final possible supply-side explanation for the disappearing civil
trial is that courts have given priority to the criminal docket, leading
to a backlog of civil cases-we term this the "criminal diversion hy-
pothesis. ' 22 The hypothesis posits that as the rate of criminal cases
increases and the pressure to dispose of them quickly mounts, some-
thing has to give, and one possible way to relieve the pressure is to
forgo the increasingly time-consuming and resource-intensive civil
trial. This potential path to decreasing civil trials has been suggested
by scholars,23 attorneys, 24 and judges alike. 25 As one commentator
stated, "Over the last few years the federal district courts have been
transformed primarily into drug courts and... [have been] unable to
move their civil dockets. In the southern district of California last
19. See Diamond & Bina, supra note 9, at 645-48, 654-57 (describing a negative correlation
between trial rate and judicial supply).
20. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 521-22; see also Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settle-
ment: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833,
856-61 (1990).
21. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, "... A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge": Judicial Mediation in
the United States, 12 J.L. & Soc'Y 1, 14-15 (1985). This hypothesis is a bit of a hybrid between a
demand explanation and a supply explanation in that it refers to the judge's actions in moving
the case forward to trial, rather than the litigants' (much like a supply explanation) but it is an
issue of decision making rather than resources (much like a demand explanation).
22. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EM-
ORY L.J. 527, 527 (1998) ("The ... requirement that criminal cases receive preferential treatment
has precluded numerous district judges from conducting a civil trial since 1995, while the district
courts have a civil backlog of thousands of suits.").
23. See, e.g., id.; Diana G. Culp, Fixing the Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., June 1990, at 62, 63-64;
Diamond & Bina, supra note 9.
24. See, e.g., THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMrTEE 36 (1990), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/
$file/repfcsc.pdf ("Drug filings not only increase the federal workload; they distort it. The
Speedy Trial Act in effect requires that federal courts give criminal cases priority over civil cases.
As a result, some districts with heavy drug caseloads are virtually unable to try civil cases and
others will soon be at that point."); id. at 160 ("Congress must appropriate resources to enable
the federal courts to deal effectively with their enlarged criminal caseload.").
25. See Tobias, supra note 22, at 540 & n.70 (referencing a conversation with Judge Raymond
J. Dearie of the eastern district of New York suggesting that criminal dockets prevent judges
from trying civil cases).
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year, for example, one-half to two-thirds of the judges' time was spent
on cocaine cases alone. '26
This argument has some support in the legal doctrine that governs
how courts may dispose of cases. The Speedy Trial Act of 197427
changed the way courts process criminal cases by establishing auto-
matic time limits that can be extended only through specific provisions
of the Act.28 Starting with the Act's full implementation in 1977, fed-
eral courts achieved high levels of compliance and decreased the time
necessary to resolve criminal cases,29 potentially diverting resources
that could have been used for civil trials. Additionally, promulgation
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 increased the time re-
quired of judges in criminal cases by making it more difficult to re-
solve sentencing hearings. 30 Many judges initially worried that the
Guidelines would reduce the rate of plea bargaining, thus forcing
more criminal cases to trial and further sapping resources away from
civil trials. 31 Finally, Department of Justice efforts to reduce plea-bar-
gain rates worried attorneys and judges alike, both of whom saw the
changes in government policy as likely to trigger an increase in re-
sources spent on criminal cases, both on the bench and in the U.S.
Attorney's office. This concern led one judge to state that the policy
"will virtually rule out the trial of civil cases."' 32
In this Article, we seek to explore the extent to which the federal
criminal docket may be contributing to the rapid disappearance of the
civil trial by taking priority in the distribution of court resources. To
do this, we examined the dataset of all federal civil and criminal cases
26. See Culp, supra note 23, at 63.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).
28. Id. § 3161(c)(1) ("In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defen-
dant .. .shall commence within seventy days from the filing date ... or from the date the
defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs."). Numerous other subsections also provide specific concrete dead-
lines. See, e.g., id. § 3161(c)(2) ("Unless the defendant consents in writing to the contrary, the
trial shall not commence less than thirty days from the date on which the defendant first appears
through counsel .... ).
29. See George S. Bridges, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Effects on Delays in Federal Criminal
Litigation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 50, 71 (1982).
30. See Culp, supra note 23, at 64 ("Ninety percent of the judges polled stated that the guide-
lines have made sentencing hearings more time-consuming."). Interestingly, in the same survey,
over 70% of the judges stated that "the guidelines have reduced the incentives for a defendant to
plead guilty, and that the percentage of guilty pleas in their current caseload has dropped." Id.
As we will see, the data have not borne out this sentiment at all, and the Guidelines appear to be
the trigger for one of the most rapid increases in plea rates in American history. See infra Part
IV.
31. See Culp, supra note 23, at 64.
32. Kate Coscarelli, Ashcroft Limit on Pleas: Crime Deterrent or Court Bottleneck?, STAR-
LEDGER, Sept. 24, 2003.
2013]
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between 1996 and 2011. We discuss evidence showing that both the
criminal trial rate and the civil trial rate have decreased as the crimi-
nal caseload has grown. Additionally, we provide novel data regard-
ing the duration of criminal proceedings, which may shed some light
on the amount of court resources dedicated to the criminal docket.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the phenome-
non of the vanishing criminal trial and briefly examines three major
statutory and doctrinal events that have influenced criminal trial rates:
the enactment of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, the promulgation of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in United States v. Booker.33 Part III assesses the crimi-
nal diversion hypothesis by comparing criminal trial rates with civil
trial rates over the past fifteen years and examining changes in the
duration of criminal proceedings over the same time period. On the
whole, we find little evidence supporting the notion that the criminal
docket can explain any portion of the vanishing civil trial rate. Part
IV examines remaining alternative hypotheses regarding the vanishing
trial and concludes by considering the consequences of the vanishing
trial.
II. PLEA BARGAINING AND THE VANISHING CRIMINAL TRIAL
The criminal docket has rapidly increased over the past forty years.
Professor Galanter reported an increase from 33,110 criminal filings in
1962 to 76,827 criminal filings in 2002,34 which supports the criminal
diversion hypothesis: as the number of criminal cases increases, the
criminal docket may take more time from the federal judiciary, which
may detract from the ability of the federal district courts to hear civil
trials. At the trial level, however, the federal criminal trial has be-
come an increasingly rare phenomenon, much like the civil trial. In
Professor Galanter's 2004 article, he noted a sharp decrease in both
the proportion of federal criminal cases that went to trial (dropping
from 15% in 1962 to less than 5% in 2002) and in the absolute number
of criminal cases tried (from just over 5,000 in 1962 to just over 3,500
in 2002).35 Though he did not report new criminal data in his 2010
draft update to the vanishing trial project, Professor Galanter and his
colleague Angela Frozena stated that "[s]o far as we can tell, much the
same story of continued absolute and percentage declines could be
33. See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
34. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 492.
35. See id. at 492-93.
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told about federal criminal cases."' 36 One possible cause of the reduc-
tion in criminal trials is an increase in plea bargaining.
Plea bargaining has become such a common phenomenon that Sixth
Amendment doctrine is being reshaped to ensure that defendants are
given a fair defense when they nearly inevitably negotiate a plea bar-
gain. In its most recent Term, the Supreme Court ruled in Missouri v.
Frye37 that the guarantee of effective legal representation applies to
plea agreements, signaling a recognition by the Court that plea bar-
gaining has become as important as any other criminal procedural
step.38 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy noted that "[t]he
reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the administra-
tion of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsi-
bilities in the plea bargain process. ' 39 In Lafler v. Cooper, the
companion case the Court handed down the same day, Justice Ken-
nedy recognized that "[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty
pleas," 40 leading to the conclusion that any view ignoring constitu-
tional rights during the plea-bargaining process "ignores the reality
that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a
system of trials. '41
In the remainder of this Part, we discuss the major changes to the
landscape of criminal procedure that may have influenced criminal
trial rates over the last forty years. Specially, we focus on three
landmark changes to the law regarding criminal procedure and plea
bargaining: the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, and United States v. Booker.
36. Marc Galanter and Angela Frozena, "A Grin Without a Cat": Civil Trials in Federal
Courts 1 n.2 (May 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/us-
courts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Marc%2OGalanter%20and%2OAn-
gela%20Frozena,%20A%2OGrin%2OWithout%20a%20Cat.pdf. The draft reports civil data
through the 2009 fiscal year. Id. at 3 tbl.1. In this Article, we extend Professor Galanter's results
through 2011 for both criminal and civil trials.
37. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
38. See Robert Barnes, Justices Expand Rights of Accused, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2012, at Al
("What makes these cases so important is the Supreme Court's full-on recognition of the central-
ity of plea bargaining in the modern criminal justice, system ...." (quoting Margaret Colgate
Love, co-author of an American Bar Association amicus brief for the case) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
39. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
40. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012). It should be noted here that Justice Ken-
nedy was referring to the rates of pleas among all convictions, rather than the rates of pleas
among all indictments. In this Article, we examine all criminal cases, both convictions and ac-
quittals, as we are interested in the total burden that the criminal docket places on the court. See
infra Part 1It.
41. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
2013]
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A. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974
In 1974, Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act with the purpose of
protecting the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a speedy criminal
trial.42 At its time of enactment, there was general public concern
about high crime rates.43 The Act was seen as a way to prevent fur-
ther crimes from being committed by defendants who were released
prior to their criminal trials without being forced to jail them in antici-
pation of trials, providing the judge "supervision and control of dan-
gerous defendants." 44 In addition to this "public" right to a speedy
trial,45 proponents of the Act were concerned with "burgeoning
caseloads" and sought to increase the rate at which courts could dis-
pose of criminal cases. 46
The current language of the Act creates two intervals 47 with maxi-
mum time limits: (1) the interval between arrest and the filing of a
charge with the court is not to exceed thirty days 48 and (2) the interval
between indictment and trial is not to exceed seventy days.49 If either
of the time limits is exceeded, the statute mandates dismissal of the
action. 50 However, the judge retains discretion over whether the dis-
missal should be with or without prejudice based on three factors:
"the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case
which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the
administration of this [Act] and on the administration of justice." 51
Additionally, several other provisions of the Act provide exceptions
42. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3161 (2006)). The relevant Sixth Amendment language states that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
VI.
43. See Bridges, supra note 29, at 50.
44. 115 CONG. REc. 34,334-35 (1969) (statement of Rep. Abner J. Mikva).
45. Interestingly, the Act was among the first pieces of law to propose that the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee applies to the public, in addition to the criminal defendant. See Bridges, supra
note 29, at 50 n.1.
46. See id. at 51 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 41,618) (1974) (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin)).
47. In the Act's initial incarnation, there were three intervals rather than two: the indictment-
to-trial interval was initially divided into an indictment-to-arraignment interval and an arraign-
ment-to-trial interval. See id. at 56. The two intervals were joined into the single seventy-day
interval through amendments passed in 1979. See id.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2006).
49. Id. § 3161(c).
50. Id. § 3162(a)(1) ("If... no indictment or information is filed within the time limit required
by section 3161(b) ... such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be
dismissed or otherwise dropped."); id. § 3162(a)(2) ("If a defendant is not brought to trial within
the time limit required by section 3161(c)... the information or indictment shall be dismissed on
motion of the defendant.").
51. Id. § 3162(a)(1).
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for various pretrial procedures that may lead to delay.52 Because of
the major impact expected of the Act, Congress allowed for a gradual
implementation: the Act was signed into law on January 3, 1975, and
its provisions went into effect on July 1, 1975. 53 Moreover, the time
limits allowed to complete each interval were initially more forgiving,
and gradually shortened each year to the current thirty- and seventy-
day windows, which went into effect on July 1, 1979.54
An initial study of the Act's effectiveness revealed that, despite the
flexibility provided by the discretion of the judge and the exceptions
-for pretrial procedures, courts typically complied with the time limits
during the initial years of the Act's existence. 55 Additionally, anecdo-
tal evidence from government attorneys supports the notion that the
Act had a real effect on giving priority to criminal cases.5 6 However,
even in the early years of the Act, the use of exceptions provided in
the statute increased.5 7 Additionally, while the Act had a clear effect
on those criminal cases that were longest in duration, the median time
from filing to disposition remained nearly constant at around 100 days
during the first five years of the Act's existence. 58
B. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 dra-
matically changed the landscape of criminal prosecutions. Until the
U.S. Sentencing Commission enacted the Guidelines, judges typically
had great discretionary control over sentencing decisions.59 The
Guidelines substantially reduced that control. Through a 258-celled
sentencing table, the Guidelines placed each offense/offender combi-
nation into a particular sentencing category, based on a criminal de-
fendant's "history score," ranked in points from one to six, and his
offense level, ranked from one to forty-three.60 Each history score
52. See Bridges, supra note 29, at 53-54 ("Many of the exceptions pertain to delays resulting
from litigating activities such as mental competency proceedings, interlocutory appeals, or mo-
tion hearings.").
53. See ANTHONY PARTRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE I OF
THE SPEEDY TRIAL Acr OF 1974, at 20 (1980).
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(f)-(g) (2006) (describing specific time limits for each interval during
the first three years of the Act).
55. See Bridges, supra note 29, at 72.
56. See THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 24, at 36.
57. See Bridges, supra note 29, at 62 & tbl.3.
58. See id. at 66, 67 fig.1.
59. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
IN AMERICA 210 (2003).
60. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 406-07 (2011), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011 Guidelines/ManualHTML/5a_SenTab.htm.
2013]
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combined with offense level yielded a particular range of sentence in
months, within which the judge had discretion to choose. 6'
As the drafters worked on the Guidelines, the immediate concern
was that the Guidelines would transfer sentencing discretion from the
judge to the prosecutor.62 Under the Guidelines, prosecutors could
strongly influence the outcome of sentencing by simply deciding how
many charges to press. 63 In an effort to combat this discretion, the
drafters put in place several checks designed to limit the extent to
which prosecutors could manipulate a sentence.64 The most powerful
of these checks allowed the judge to consider the "broadly defined
'[rielevant [c]onduct' of the defendant" when making a sentencing de-
cision and gave the judge discretion to reject a plea bargain that would
undermine the purpose of the Guidelines.65
While it was hoped that these efforts would cabin prosecutorial
power, one analyst suggested that they eventually had the opposite
effect, as judges took the opportunity to impose harsher sentences
than those in the Guidelines and frequently aligned themselves with
prosecutors. 66 Because prosecutors were given the right to appeal
judge reductions from the Guidelines range based on one of the
checks mentioned above, judges were hesitant to reduce the specified
sentence below the Guideline range for fear of being reversed on ap-
peal.67 In stark contrast, following the Guidelines would ensure
nearly complete safety from reversal. 68
A number of early studies documented the effects of the Guidelines
on plea rates. Though the Guidelines were enacted in 1987, their real
force did not take effect until January 1989, when they were declared
constitutional in Mistretta v. United States.69 Prior to that case, they
were, in many circuits, either not applied at all or applied
nonuniformly. 70 One early study of the Fifth Circuit found significant
61. See FISHER, supra note 59, at 210, 212.
62. See U.S. SENrENCING COMM'N, supra note 60, at 1-15.
63. This concern is specifically mentioned in the introduction to the Guidelines. Id. at 6.
("One of the most important [drawbacks of the Guidelines] is the potential it affords prosecutors
to influence sentences by increasing or decreasing the number of counts in an indictment.").
64. See FISHER, supra note 59, at 212-13.
65. See id. (internal quotations omitted).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 217.
68. Id.
69. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
70. Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting
Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 402 (1991).
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decreases in plea-bargaining rates for a number of different offenses. 71
However, that study found no significant increase or decrease across
all offense types.72 More recent examinations have revealed signifi-
cant increases in overall plea-bargaining rates that seem to coincide
with the outcome in Mistretta. While overall plea-bargaining rates re-
mained somewhat steady between 84% and 85% from 1984 to 1989,
rates began to climb soon after, reaching 94% by 2001.73
C. United States v. Booker
More recently, the scope of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines took
on a new form as a result of a series of cases that would eventually
render the Guidelines merely advisory. In Apprendi v. New Jersey,74 a
criminal defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm, which
carried a prison sentence of five to ten years under New Jersey's statu-
tory scheme. 75 Following the guilty plea, the prosecutor filed a motion
to extend the sentence based on a separate New Jersey statute that
provided for an "extended term" if the defendant was found to have
committed a hate crime. 76 The trial judge, after hearing testimony on
the issue, found that a hate crime had been committed and extended
the sentence.77 The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the trial judge on
grounds that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any
fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. '78
This concept was later applied to mandatory sentencing in Blakely
v. Washington, in which the Supreme Court invalidated Washington's
mandatory sentencing guidelines on the basis that sentences were in
part determined based on facts found by the judge, rather than by the
jury based on a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.79 Though the
United States submitted an amicus curiae brief urging the Court to
uphold Washington's guidelines, presumably based on the assumption
71. Id. at 403-04, 405 tbl.1 (documenting statistically significant decreases in plea-bargaining
rates for credit card fraud, cocaine distribution, alien reentry, and larceny).
72. Id. at 404.
73. FISHER, supra note 59, at 223 tbl.9.1.
74. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
75. See id. at 468-70.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 470-71.
78. Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
79. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-05 (2004).
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that the highly similar Federal Sentencing Guidelines would be next
on the chopping block, the Court specifically noted that it "ex-
press[ed] no opinion" on the Federal Guidelines. 80
The Government's instinct proved prescient, however, as just six
months later in United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether the Blakely rule applied to the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines.81 As the government had anticipated, the Court
ruled that "there is no distinction of constitutional significance be-
tween the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington proce-
dures at issue in [Blakely]." 82 As an alternative to abandoning the
Guidelines altogether, the Court noted that the Sixth Amendment
protection would not be implicated if the Guidelines were interpreted
to be advisory; the Court thus severed those provisions that made the
Guidelines mandatory and binding on district judges, which led to the
advisory Guidelines that are in place today.83
While the full effect of Booker is not yet entirely clear, the case
seems to have influenced sentencing. Initial studies indicate that dis-
trict courts readily used their newfound discretion. One study re-
ported that in 2004 (one year before Booker was decided) 71.8% of
sentences were within the Guidelines range, but that percentage im-
mediately dropped to 61.6% the year following Booker and continued
to fall to 56.8% by 2009.84 The number of below-Guidelines sentences
has nearly tripled, from 4.6% in 2004 to 12.1% in 2006.85 Likewise,
above-Guidelines sentences have doubled, from 0.6% in 2004 to 1.6%
in 2006.86 The author of that study noted, however, that there had
been other rapid drops of within-Guidelines sentences prior to
Booker, so it is difficult to say whether these shifts were a direct result
of Booker.87
80. Id. at 305 n.9.
81. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
82. Id. at 233.
83. See id. ("If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory provisions
that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in response to
differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have never
doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a
statutory range."); id. at 259 ("Application of these criteria indicates that we must sever and
excise two specific statutory provisions: the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a
sentence within the applicable Guidelines range ....").
84. D. Michael Fisher, Still in Balance? Federal District Court Discretion and Appellate Review
Six Years After Booker, 49 DuQ. L. REv. 641, 661-62 (2011).
85. Id. at 662-63.
86. Id. at 663.
87. See id. at 662 (noting a drop from 83.4% in 1990 to 64% in 2001).
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Substantial changes have occurred over time in the way criminal
cases are handled in the federal courts. These changes were initially
set in motion by the Sentencing Guidelines and modified by recent
Supreme Court decisions that have changed the role of the judge in
sentencing. In our analysis, we consider the potential role that these
changes, as well as the criminal trial, have played in the decline of the
civil trial.
III. ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL DIVERSION HYPOTHESIS
Having sketched the recent major shifts in criminal procedure that
likely influenced criminal trial rates, and thus potentially influenced
civil trial rates, we now turn to the task of assessing the criminal diver-
sion hypothesis by examining court caseload data. Specifically, this
Part examines several predictions that a proponent of the criminal di-
version hypothesis might make regarding civil and criminal trial rates.
First, if the criminal diversion hypothesis is correct, civil trials and trial
rates should continue to decrease over time because an increasing
number of court resources are occupied by the criminal docket. Sec-
ond, if resources are being diverted from civil cases to criminal cases,
the number of criminal trials should increase at the same time as, or
just after, the decrease in civil trials. Third, the total duration of time
spent on criminal proceedings, both before disposition and between
disposition and sentencing, should increase if judges are prioritizing
criminal cases over civil cases. We will test each of these hypotheses
below.
A. The Criminal Diversion Hypothesis and Civil Trial Rates
A necessary premise of the criminal diversion hypothesis is that
civil trials have decreased over time both as a raw number of trials and
as a percentage of civil filings. Professor Galanter clearly demon-
strated this phenomenon in his seminal 2004 article,88 and showed in
his update using data through 2009 that the trend has continued: the
absolute number of civil trials in federal courts dropped from nearly
4,000 in 2004 to just over 3,000 in 2009.89 In that article, Professor
Galanter framed the story as "no news and big news" in that "[t]he no
news story is that the trend lines regarding trials are unchanged. The
big news story is that the civil trial is approaching extinction." 90 Fig-
88. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 462-66.
89. Galanter & Frozena, supra note 36, at 2 fig.1.
90. Id. at 1.
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ure 1 updates these numbers with the absolute number of civil trials
from 2010 and 2011.91
FIGURE 1: ABSOLUTE NUMBER OF FEDERAL CIVIL CASES
REACHING TRIAL, 1997-201192
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91. According to George Cort of the Federal Judicial Center, the number and rate of civil
trials for 2007 and 2008 were artificially inflated due to two large class actions. Professor Ga-
lanter reported a similar problem in his 2010 draft, noting an "apparent jump ... due to misre-
porting of aggregate cases in [the] middle district of Louisiana," though Professor Galanter
identified 2006 and 2007 as the misreported years. Galanter & Frozena, supra note 36, at 3 n.3.
In the civil data that we report, there are large outliers in only the 2007 and 2008 data; with that
exception, we find a steady decline in the absolute numbers of criminal trials from 3,951 in 2004
to 3,194 in 2011. See infra Figure 1. In that range, each year has fewer recorded trials than the
last. In 2007, however, there were 9,832 recorded trials, and in 2008 there were 4,723. We do not
believe that these numbers reflect representative trial numbers, so we have excluded these two
years from all figures of civil trials in this Article.
92. Derived by authors from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.
See STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS 152 tbl.C-4 (1997); STATISTICS ON FEDERAL CIVIL CASES, supra, at 166 tbl.C-4 (1998);
STATISTICS ON FEDERAL CIVIL CASES, supra, at 160 tbl.C-4 (1999); id., at 159 tbl.C-4 (2000); id.,
at 154 tbl.C-4 (2001); id., at 153 tbl.C-4 (2002); id., at 150 tbl.C-4 (2003); id., at 156 tbl.C-4 (2004);
id., at 182 tbl.C-4 (2005); id., at 182 tbl.C-4 (2006); id., at 169 tbl.C-4 (2007); id., at 167 tbl.C-4
(2008); id., at 165 tbl.C-4 (2009); id., at 168 tbl.C-4 (2010); id., at 149 tbl.C-4 (2011). It is
important to note that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts releases several different
annual tables, which report trial statistics in various formats. In this Article, we report statistics
from the following tables: C-4 and D-4, which provide information regarding the number, type,
and progress of cases terminated in a given year (for civil and criminal cases, respectively); C-3
and D-3, which provide information on the number, type, and progress of cases commenced in a
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The most recent data slightly modify the story of the downfall of the
trial. An extremely low number of civil cases reach trial, but the
2009-2011 data indicate that, for the first time since 1998, no further
losses have been occurring in the raw number of trials. In fact, 2010
saw a small increase in the absolute number of civil cases reaching
trial, from 3,271 trials in 2009 to 3,309 in 2010. It is, however, far too
early to tell whether this is indicative of a "bottoming out" of the
number of civil trials; a similar trend can be seen between 2004 and
2005, when the number of trials only dropped from 3,951 (in 2004) to
3,899 (in 2005) before resuming the steep downward trend.93
Turning to the percentage of civil cases that reach trial, Figure 2
shows a very similar shape to the curve-the continuing downward
trend as originally reported by Professor Galanter, followed by a lev-
eling off in 2011.
given year; and T-1, which provides the number of contested proceedings involving the
presentation of evidence, including evidentiary hearings and sentencing hearings for both civil
and criminal trials. In his 2004 article, Professor Galanter relied primarily on trial data from
table C-4, so we initially present our updated trial data based on that table. For additional
explanation of the various tables provided by the Administrative Office, see Herbert M. Kritzer,
The Trials and Tribulations of Counting "Trials", 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 415 (2012). Finally, we
also present data not available in the Administrative Office Annual Report in the form of data
on the duration of trials. See infra Figures 13-14.
93. See supra note 92 and accompanying Figure. We also calculated both the absolute number
of civil trials per judge and the absolute number of criminal defendants disposed of by trial per
judge. We have not presented these data graphically because the number of active judges over
the past fifteen years has remained relatively steady, and thus the data convey little information
not already conveyed in Figures 1 and 5. In 1996, there were 603 active Article III judges and
502 magistrate judges. These numbers fluctuate from year to year with a slow rise, ending with
646 active Article III judges and 574 magistrate judges in 2011-a difference of 115 judges, or a
9% increase. This increase was not enough to account for the quickly diminishing criminal and
civil trial rates; that is, the number of civil and criminal trials per judge has steadily decreased
over the past fifteen years.
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FIGURE 2: PERCENT OF FEDERAL CIVIL CASES REACHING TRIAL,
1997-201194
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The increase in absolute trial numbers in 2010 is not reflected in the
percentage of cases reaching trial, however, which dropped from
1.24% to 1.07% between 2009 and 2010. Nonetheless, the percentage
drop from 1.07% to 1.05% between 2010 and 2011 is the smallest drop
in the entire sample and the smallest drop since 1993-1994, when the
percentage of civil cases resulting in trial moved from 3.4% to 3.5%.95
As with the absolute trial numbers, we must wait for future years to
know whether the trial rate has finally hit rock bottom or will con-
tinue to fall.
While this drop in civil trials would be unsurprising if the number of
civil filings were decreasing, this is not the case, as we have learned
from Professor Galanter's and others' previous work. Figure 3 dis-
plays the relatively steady levels of civil filings over the past fifteen
years, hovering around 250,000 filings per year, with a sharp increase
in filings between 2008 and 2010. Despite this sharp increase, there is
no corresponding increase in the absolute number of civil trials or the
percentage of civil cases reaching trial.
94. Derived by authors from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.
See supra note 92.
95. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 534 tbl.A-2.
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FIGURE 3: TOTAL CIVIL FILINGS, 1997-201196
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The drop in number of civil trials over time, as Galanter showed,
has not been confined to jury trials. As Figure 4 indicates, the num-
bers of both jury and bench trials have decreased over time. Moreo-
ver, both appear to have leveled off between 2009 and 2011.
96. Derived by authors from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.
See supra note 92.
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FIGURE 4: ABSOLUTE NUMBERS OF CIVIL BENCH AND JURY
TRIALS, 1997-201197
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At bottom, the overall pattern of civil trials and civil trial rates from
1997 through 2011 lays the groundwork for the criminal diversion hy-
pothesis by providing evidence that federal courts have been spending
less and less time on civil trials: both the absolute number of federal
civil trials and the rate of federal civil trials have declined over the
past fifteen years as they did in decades before. Next, we turn to the
question of whether the increased federal criminal docket explains
any portion of this decline.
B. The Criminal Diversion Hypothesis and Criminal Trial Rates
One might expect that the chief predictions made by the criminal
diversion hypothesis would relate to the number of criminal trials that
are being conducted by the federal judiciary. The trial is one of the
most resource-demanding elements of litigation-courts managing a
trial must deal with preparation for the trial, including pretrial mo-
tions, jury selection, and evidentiary hearings; the management of the
trial itself; and sentencing, which can involve additional determina-
tions of fact. Thus, one can safely assume that, given a consistent
97. Derived by authors from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.
See supra note 92.
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criminal caseload, courts will be more burdened by the criminal
docket if more criminal cases go to trial.
Given this reasoning, if the criminal diversion hypothesis is correct,
there should be a relative increase in the number of criminal trials and
the criminal trial rate as compared to the number of civil trials and the
civil trial rate. If the criminal docket (i.e., the total number of cases) is
expanding along with a constant or increasing rate of criminal cases
that go to trial, it will produce a greater relative demand for the
court's time. Thus, even if there is not specific priority given to crimi-
nal trials, judges may simply have to deal with a heavy criminal docket
that takes a great amount of time, and this dedication of resources to
the criminal docket means less time for civil trials. Therefore, civil
litigants' motives to go to trial are reduced (based on the knowledge
that it may take a long time to have the case tried, the court may
devote fewer resources and less energy to the trial, and so on), leading
to fewer civil trials overall. Obviously, a larger number of criminal
trials as compared to civil trials, a shift toward more criminal trials and
fewer civil trials, or both, would support this hypothesis. We now turn
to the evidence regarding the number of criminal trials and criminal
trial rates to determine whether there is support for the criminal di-
version hypothesis.
Figure 5 presents the number of criminal defendants disposed of in
the federal courts from 1996 to 2011.
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FIGURE 5: TOTAL CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS DISPOSED, 1996-201198
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The data clearly show an increasing federal criminal docket. While
civil filings have increased only 21% over the past fifteen years (from
249,336 filings in 1997 to 302,922 filings in 2011), criminal dispositions
have nearly doubled, from 63,148 total dispositions in 1997 to 101,149
in 2011. Based on this, one can infer that courts might be spending an
increasing amount of time on criminal cases and thus have reduced
ability to move civil cases through trial.
Turning to trial numbers, Figures 6 and 7 display the total number
of federal criminal trials from 1997 to 2011. The Administrative Of-
fice of the U.S. Courts defines a "trial" as a "contested proceeding[ ]
before a court or jury at which evidence is introduced." 99 This broad
definition includes sentencing hearings as well as hearings on motions
such as preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. We
refer to these contested hearings with evidence as "trial proceedings."
Because sentencing hearings are relatively brief and may not be as
98. Derived by authors from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.
See STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS 221 tbl.D-4 (1996); id., at 214 tbl.D-4 (1997); id., at 228 tbl.D-4 (1998); id., at 222 tbl.D-4
(1999); id., at 221 tbl.D-4 (2000); id., at 211 tbl.D-4 (2001); id., at 211 tbl.D-4 (2002); id., at 211
tbl.D-4 (2003); id., at 217 tbl.D-4 (2004); id., at 245 tbl.D-4 (2005); id., at 249 tbl.D-4 (2006); id.,
at 246 tbl.D-4 (2007); id., at 244 tbl.D-4 (2008); id., at 239 tbl.D-4 (2009); id., at 242 tbl.D-4
(2010); id., at 230 tbl.D-4 (2011).
99. Id. tbl.T-1 n.1.
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burdensome on the courts as other proceedings, instead primarily re-
flecting input from other legal actors (such as probation officers
charged with preparing presentence reports), we present data both in-
cluding and excluding sentencing hearings.
FIGURE 6: TOTAL CRIMINAL TRIALS (EXCLUDING SENTENCING
HEARINGS), 1997-2011100
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100. Derived by authors from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts. See STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL'BUSINESS OF THE
U.S. COURTS, tbl.T-1 (1997) id., at 374 tbl.T-1 (1998); id., at 365 tbl.T-1 (1999); id., at 377 tbl.T-1
(2000); id., at 366 tbl.T-1 (2001); id., at 371 tbl.T-1 (2002); id., at tbl.T-1 (2003); id., at 375 tbl.T-1
(2004); id., at 409 tbl.T-1 (2005); id., at 395 tbl.T-1 (2006); id., at 390 tbl.T-1 (2007); id., at 388
tbl.T-1 (2008); id., at 383 tbl.T-1 (2009); id., at 388 tbl.T-1 (2010); id., at 374 tbl.T-4 (2011). We
present data from table T-1 of the annual report, which reports the number of trials commenced,
rather than data from Table D-4, which reports the number of defendants disposed of through
trial. Here, we are interested in the burden that the criminal docket places on the court, and
dispositional data do not provide complete information on that burden because the defendant
may reach a plea-bargaining agreement before the conclusion of the trial. While such a trial
certainly places a burden on the court, it is not represented in the dispositional data reported in
table D-4. Thus, our data consider all trials commenced, regardless of the way the case was
disposed.
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FIGURE 7: TOTAL CRIMINAL TRIALS (INCLUDING SENTENCING
HEARINGS), 1997-2011101
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While Figure 1 displayed a decreasing pattern of civil trials, Figures
6 and 7 show that the number of criminal trials and trial proceedings
have increased over the past fifteen years. 102 Figure 6 shows that
when sentencing hearings are excluded, this increase has been rather
modest, from 6,814 total trials in 1997 to 8,453 in 2011. The increase,
shown in Figure 7, has been more dramatic when sentencing hearings
are included, from 10,426 trials in 1997 to 14,656 trials in 2011. While
the number of total trial proceedings including sentencing hearings
actually declined by 314 between 1997 and 2004 (from 10,426 in 1997
to 10,112 in 2004), the total trial proceedings increased by 4,544 be-
tween 2004 and 2011. Booker was decided on January 12, 2005,103
likely influencing trial rates in 2005 and beyond. Booker has been
interpreted as reducing the power of the prosecutor in eliciting plea
bargains, so an increase in both the absolute number of trials and the
percentage of criminal cases that go to trial would be expected. 0 4
101. Derived by authors from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts. See supra note 100.
102. As we did with the civil trial numbers, we calculated the absolute number of criminal
trials per sitting federal judge and saw no appreciable difference from what is depicted here. See
supra note 93.
103. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
104. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, as made clear by Figure 7, Booker has required courts to
make additional findings of fact in order to reach a sentencing deci-
sion, producing a substantial increase in the number of sentencing
hearings.
Combining Figures 6 and 7 with Figure 5 yields a rate of trial pro-
ceedings per disposed defendant, as depicted in Figures 8 and 9.
FIGURE 8: CRIMINAL TRIALS (EXCLUDING SENTENCING HEARINGS)
PER DISPOSED DEFENDANT, 1997-2011105
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105. See supra notes 98, 101 and accompanying Figures.
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FIGURE 9: CRIMINAL TRIALS (INCLUDING SENTENCING HEARINGS)
PER DISPOSED DEFENDANT, 1997-20111o6
0.19-
0.17-
z 0.15-
0.13-
0.11-
0.09-
" 0.07-
n n;
Year
The shape of the curves in Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate that while
the raw number of criminal trial proceedings has increased over time,
the trial rate is not keeping pace with the increase in the number of
defendants disposed of. When sentencing hearings are excluded,
there is a slow but steady decline in trial rate, from about 0.11 trials
per defendant in 1997 to roughly 0.08 trials per defendant in 2011.
Similarly, when including sentencing hearings, there were roughly 0.17
trial proceedings per defendant disposed of in 1997, but only 0.14 per
defendant in 2011, though this number was up from the low of 0.12
trial proceedings per defendant in 2003.
106. See supra notes 98, 101 and accompanying Figures.
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Despite these statistics, recall that in order to support the criminal
diversion hypothesis, one need not show that there is an increase or
leveling off in criminal trial rates over time. Instead, evidence that
more court resources are being diverted to criminal proceedings over
time is the key. Thus, the increase in raw numbers of criminal trial
proceedings over time provides some support for the hypothesis. A
further test, shown in Figures 10 and 11, compares civil and criminal
trials between 1997 and 2011 to determine whether criminal and civil
trial levels display a complementary pattern of change over time, and
are thus consistent with the notion that substitution of criminal for
civil trials has been occurring.
FIGURE 10: TOTAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
(EXCLUDING SENTENCING HEARINGS), 1997-2011107
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107. Derived by authors from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts. See supra note 100.
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-w- Criminal
-- Total
2013]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 11: TOTAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS (INCLUDING
SENTENCING HEARINGS), 1997-20111o8
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The strongest support for the criminal diversion hypothesis would
be a figure depicting a crossover interaction between civil and crimi-
nal trial numbers in which civil trials decline over time and criminal
trials show a complementary increase over the same period. That is
not what the figures show. Figure 10 shows that the major decline in
civil trials occured between 1997 and 2003, a period during which the
civil trial declined by nearly 50% (from 10,155 trials in 1997 to 5,830 in
2003). However, there is no corresponding increase in criminal trials
during that period that could explain the decrease in civil trials, as the
criminal diversion hypothesis would predict. 109 When including sen-
tencing hearings (Figure 11), the total number of criminal trial pro-
ceedings actually declined during that period, before a sharp increase
starting with Booker in 2005. That sharp increase, however, did not
result in a subsequent decrease in civil trials. Instead the number of
civil trials begins to level off in 2005 (there were 5,830 civil trials in
2003 and 5,357 in 2011), at precisely the time when the criminal diver-
sion hypothesis would predict a reduction based on the increased
108. Derived by authors from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts. See supra note 100.
109. We also examined the patterns over time within each circuit and found no evidence that
criminal trials displaced civil trials between 1997 and 2003, when civil trials showed their most
dramatic drop. In all, the individual circuit data look much like the data shown in Figure 10.
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criminal trial rate. Even when discounting criminal sentencing hear-
ings, the criminal diversion hypothesis cannot account for the civil
trial rates; the sharp reduction in civil trials from 1997 to 2003 is not
accompanied by a corresponding increase in criminal trials in Figure
10.
Another source of diversion would be possible if criminal bench tri-
als dropped over time, but criminal jury trials remained steady or in-
creased over time. Jury trials are generally perceived to be more
resource-intensive for the courts, so an increased number of jury trials
may demand more court resources even while holding constant the
total number of trials (bench plus jury). As Figure 12 shows, however,
jury trials have declined over time, while bench trials have remained
steady. Following a temporary increase in 2005, jury trials showed a
continued decline, at least through 2011.
FIGURE 12: TOTAL CRIMINAL JURY AND BENCH TRIALS,
1997-2011110
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In sum, the criminal trial rates provide little support for the criminal
diversion hypothesis. In terms of total trials, while the number of
criminal trials has risen, that rise occurred after most of the reduction
in civil trials took place, while the criminal diversion hypothesis would
110. Derived by authors from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts. See supra note 100.
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predict that reductions in civil trials would follow, or at least accom-
pany, increases in criminal trials. Moreover, while civil trial rates have
declined, those declines are not matched by corresponding increases
in criminal trials or trial proceedings. As a proportion of the overall
caseload, criminal trial rates have also declined since 1997. However,
this examination of trials and trial rates does not paint the full picture
of the criminal diversion hypothesis. While trials are extremely time
and resource consuming, the possibility remains that other parts of the
criminal docket, such as motion practice and sentencing, take re-
sources away from the judge that could be used for the expeditious
processing of civil cases to trial. The real measure that would be most
informative is the total amount of time and resources spent by the
judge on civil cases and on criminal cases-trial rates are simply one
of many potential proxies for this measure. We know of no compre-
hensive measure of this resource allocation, but in the next Subpart,
we attempt to approximate a measure of the total resources spent by
the court by examining the duration of federal criminal cases over
time.
C. The Criminal Diversion Hypothesis and Criminal
Case Durations
While trial rates are easily measured, the allocation of work by a
federal judge is far more complicated to assess. As a result, it is diffi-
cult to determine how much time, absolutely or relatively, federal
judges spend on criminal versus civil cases. Here we use one, albeit
imperfect, proxy: the number of days that a criminal case remains in
the federal system between indictment and trial or plea. Specifically,
we measured the time from an individual's indictment to the begin-
ning of trial or entering of a plea. We chose this particular timeframe
primarily because it is likely to be the time that the court is spending
the most time on a criminal case, and thus the greatest contributor to
possible diversion.
Additionally, there are two reasons why we have chosen to use the
number of days as our measure: (1) it is definite and objectively mea-
surable and (2) it can be measured at the single case level-we can
identify the duration of each and every case that is processed in the
federal courts. Of course, the obvious major downside of using this
variable as a proxy for judicial workload is that it may not represent
judicial workload at all: cases may sit idly for long intervals without
requiring action from the judge, increasing the total duration of the
case but not using judicial resources. Nonetheless, the Speedy Trial
Act reduces the possible interval of inactivity for criminal cases, unless
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the defendant permits a longer delay by waiving his right to a speedy
trial. We further discuss this limitation below in our assessment of the
meaning of our results.
The federal courts track criminal case duration data in three differ-
ent intervals: (1) from a suspect's arrest to his indictment or first ap-
pearance before a court, (2) from the defendant's indictment to either
his trial or his plea bargain, and (3) from the defendant's conviction to
his sentencing."' The Speedy Trial Act has a definite influence on
these durations. Most notably, it provides time limits on the first two
intervals: the time from a suspect's arrest to the filing of a charge
against him cannot exceed thirty days 1 2 and the duration from a de-
fendant's indictment to his trial or plea bargain cannot exceed seventy
days.113 While these limitations provide only hard ceilings to guide
the court and thus do not severely limit what can be extrapolated from
the data, they are worth bearing in mind as we move forward.
Here, we focus on the second of these intervals: the duration from
the defendant's indictment to his trial or plea. We focus on this inter-
val because it is the period of time when the judge is likely to be most
heavily involved in the case. The first interval, from arrest to indict-
ment, occurs largely before the court gets involved in the proceed-
ing-law enforcement and the prosecution are investigating the case
and preparing for indictment while the court plays only a minimal
role. The third interval, conviction to sentencing, requires court re-
sources, but absorbs much less judicial time, particularly if a plea
agreement has already been reached. The second interval, indictment
to either trial or a guilty plea, is the timeframe in which the judge is
most heavily involved in the case, handling motions from the parties
and working to move the case toward trial or other disposition within
the seventy-day window.114
111. Unfortunately, we do not have access to case-level data on the duration of trials, which
would also be valuable information in assessing the extent to which the criminal trial is a burden
on the system and limits the availability of the courts for civil trials.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2006).
113. Id. § 3161(c)(1).
114. The seventy-day window can, of course, be extended through a variety of procedures,
such as "delay" resulting from mental competency hearings, other charges against the defendant,
interlocutory appeal, pretrial motions, transfer of the case, or consideration of plea agreements.
Id. § 3161(h)(1). Defendants cannot, however, expressly waive the right to a speedy trial since
the Supreme Court's decision in Zedner v. United States, in which the Court concluded that the
public's interest in a speedy trial is also protected by the Act. See Zedner v. United States, 547
U.S. 489, 500-01 (2006). If the defendant wishes to waive the right, however, he may be able to
do so using one of the many devices provided for in the Act. In our dataset, 10% of cases lasted
longer than seventy days between indictment and trial or plea.
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Applying these intervals to our assessment of the criminal diversion
hypothesis, if the hypothesis is correct, there should be an increase in
court resources spent on criminal trials, which may be driving a drop
in civil trials if resources are being "diverted" from civil to criminal
trials. The first form this could take would be an increase in the aver-
age time spent per criminal trial from indictment to trial or plea. 115
The second form would be a growth in the total number of days occu-
pied by all criminal cases. We begin with duration per case.
Turning to the data, Figure 13 presents the median duration from
indictment to either a trial or a plea bargain."16
115. There is some potential argument that a shift in either direction could support the crimi-
nal diversion hypothesis. If the average duration of a criminal case increases over time, it could
mean that courts are spending more time and resources on criminal cases; the more time that the
case is in the judge's hands, the more energy he likely devotes to it. However, the contrary
explanation might also carry some weight: an increased duration of criminal trials could mean
that judges are devoting less time to processing cases quickly, taking the maximum time afforded
to them under the Speedy Trial Act, which might not be burdening the court to the point that
civil trials are compromised. Likewise, if the average duration of criminal cases decreases over
time, it could mean either that judges are devoting maximum resources to them in order to
speedily move them through the system, or it could mean that the cases are simply easier to
resolve-with fewer going to trial and a reduced amount of work spent on each case. We find
the first hypothesis much more plausible-there is no reason to expect that judges are suddenly
spending more resources on criminal cases to resolve them more quickly. If anything, the in-
creased docket makes quick resolution more difficult. Thus, we proceed on the assumption that
the criminal diversion hypothesis would predict an increase in the duration of criminal .cases,
thereby reducing the amount of time the court has for civil trials.
116. These data were collected from a large database kept by the Federal Judicial Center of all
federal criminal defendant dispositions. One variable in the database coded for the "net days
consumed from indictment or information, or first appearance before a judicial officer where
charges are pending to trial . . . or a plea of guilty or nolo." INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR
POLITICAL & Soc. RESEARCH, FED. COURT CASES INTEGRATED DATABASE 25 (2007). This
variable ranged from a minimum value of zero days to a maximum value of 999 days. When
examining the dataset, we discovered abnormal shifts in the coding of interval lengths of zero,
one, and seventy and above, which seemed to be indicative of changes in coding methodology
over time. Thus, we restricted our sample to only cases in which the interval was between two
and sixty-nine days and were disposed of by trial or a plea. This restricted sample contained
approximately 60% of all cases in the dataset. The combined interval lengths of zero and one
were approximately evenly distributed over time, as were the lengths of seventy and above, so
we have no reason to believe that this restriction in sampling systematically affected our ob-
served intervals over time. Nonetheless, this limits the conclusions that we can draw from these
data.
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FIGURE 13: MEDIAN DURATION FROM INDICTMENT TO TRIAL OR
PLEA, 1996-2011117
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The figure tells a story of relatively little change in the median
amount of time required for criminal cases between indictment and
trial or plea over the past fifteen years.1 18 The median duration was
thirty-three days in 1996, followed by a small but steady climb to a
high point of thirty-seven days in 2002. After 2004, the duration has
remained relatively stable, never shifting outside of a thirty-four-to-
thirty-seven day range, and finishing with a median of thirty-five days
in 2011. None of these shifts appear to be representative of a larger
overall trend because the duration is not changing over time.
However, even though the median and mean number of days during
this interval have not changed, there is another way in which diversion
can be expressed. Recall that the number of criminal cases handled
by the federal courts has nearly doubled over time-from 63,148 in
1997 to 101,149 in 2011.119 Thus, the sheer volume of criminal cases to
117. Derived by authors from data provided by the Federal Judicial Center (on file with
authors).
118. The mean duration, which we do not present, takes on nearly the exact same shape as the
median duration. In 2006, the mean duration from indictment to trial or a plea bargain was 33.5
days, with a steady, small increase to a high level of 36.3 days in 2004, and has remained stable
since then, with a mean of 34.9 days in 2011.
119. See supra Figure 5.
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handle might divert the court to the criminal docket even if the aver-
age time to trial or plea remained constant.
Aggregating the average values of processing time above, in Figure
14 we arrive at a total number of days spent processing federal crimi-
nal cases from indictment to trial or plea bargaining.
FIGURE 14: TOTAL PROCESSING TIME FROM INDICTMENT TO TRIAL
OR PLEA, 1996-2011120
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This figure represents the grand total number of days that criminal
cases are open during the interval most burdensome to the federal
courts. Here, we see a different picture of the amount of strain that
the criminal docket places on the court. As the overall criminal
docket has nearly doubled and the average duration of the proceed-
ings leading up to the plea or trial has remained steady, the overall
number of days that the court must devote to these cases in this inter-
val has likewise nearly doubled, from 1.04 million total days in 1996 to
1.87 million in 2011. Thus, if the number of days criminal cases spend
in the system before trial or plea is a good proxy for the amount of
resources the court must put into the criminal docket, these data do
provide some evidence for the criminal diversion hypothesis. While
120. Derived by authors from data provided by the Federal Judicial Center (on file with
authors).
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the average duration of each criminal case from indictment to trial or
plea has remained constant over the past fifteen years, this fact com-
bined with the fact that the docket has increased has led to a much
greater number of days that criminal cases are before the court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The story told by the data presented here is a modest one: we find
some limited, potential support for the criminal diversion hypothesis
in the period between 1996 and 2011. To summarize our findings, we
have shown that the decreases in civil trial rates demonstrated by Pro-
fessor Galanter in 2004121 and again in 2010 (with data through the
2009 fiscal year) 122 persist through 2011, though the recent years sug-
gest the possibility that the civil trial rate has finally hit its floor and
begun to level off. As Galanter has suggested, however, there is little
room for further decrease. Despite the rapidly increasing number of
criminal defendants moved through the federal court system, the
number of federal criminal trials has only increased slightly when one
does not consider sentencing hearings as trials. Even when sentencing
hearings are included, the increase in criminal trial proceedings has
not led to an accompanying or subsequent decrease in civil trials. In
terms of a percentage of the total docket, criminal trial rates have re-
mained steady. While this doesn't necessarily discount the criminal
diversion hypothesis as criminal docket factors (such as changes in the
mix of cases) could be in part responsible for the decline of the civil
trial, this evidence provides no clear support for the theory that crimi-
nal trials themselves are responsible for reducing the number of civil
trials.
Of course, the trial is not the only criminal procedure that burdens
the federal courts-courts must also move cases through the system
toward the trial or plea. Our data regarding the duration of federal
criminal cases are more difficult to interpret because they are an im-
perfect proxy for the judicial workload, but they offer some indication
that the increasing number of criminal cases in the system may de-
mand greater attention from judges, providing some support for the
criminal diversion hypothesis. The average time per case for the
phase in which the court is most involved (between indictment and
plea or a trial) has remained unchanged over the past fifteen years,
indicating that judges are spending no more time with each criminal
case on their docket. Over the same interval, however, the criminal
121. See Galanter, supra note 1.
122. See Galanter & Froznea, supra note 36.
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caseload of the federal courts has grown, as have the total days de-
voted to criminal cases between indictment and trial or plea. While it
is unclear whether this means judges are prioritizing criminal cases
over civil ones or if they are actually spending more time on criminal
cases, the pattern does offer some support for the criminal diversion
hypothesis.
Our results clearly do not explain the precipitous drop in federal
civil trials that Professor Galanter identified nearly a decade ago. As
he suggested, many other sources are likely explanations for the van-
ishing civil trial. He cataloged a number of these explanations in a
2005 article in the Stanford Law Review,123 including:
* A change in the mix of cases being filed, with fewer trial-prone
types of cases in the mix;
* Increasing complexity and cost of going to trial;
* Longer wait times in order to reach trial;
* Exaggerated estimations of plaintiff success by corporate
defendants;
* An increased use of alternative dispute resolution; and
* A shift of the judicial role from trial judge to dispute resolver,
and an increased pretrial judicial role.
Our data here do not speak directly to any of these competing theo-
ries, although our results do suggest that judges may be spending an
increased amount of their time on criminal matters. Yet we have no
direct measure of the extent to which there is a longer wait time for
civil trials than there was in the past. We note one important way,
which we could not measure here, that an expanding criminal docket
without an increase in number of trials could be displacing civil trials
on the docket. If criminal defendants plead guilty on the eve of trial, a
trial does not take place although court time has been reserved for
that trial. And defendants do enter pleas on the eve of trial.' 24 We
cannot know whether last minute pleading by defendants on the grow-
ing criminal docket could be causing a serious displacement of the
civil trial without studying trial dates and last minute pleas. That is a
study waiting to be done.
One other result from our current research offers a limited survival
sign for the vanishing civil trial. Our modest update of Galanter's
trends through 2011 suggests that federal civil trial rates may finally be
leveling off. The question that remains on the table, if we find that the
123. Galanter, supra note 15, at 1262-63.
124. See, e.g., Times Topics, Bernard B. Kerik, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ref-
erence/timestopics/peoplelklbernard_b kerik/index.html (last updated May 18, 2010); Press Re-
lease, U.S. District Attorney's Office, Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Felony Charges on Eve of Trial
(Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.fbi.govlasvegas/press-releases/2OlOlvO22310.htm.
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decline has finally hit bottom and the smile of the Cheshire cat still
remains, is whether the remnant is enough to provide "a legal system
in which judges and juries devise public standards and assess account-
ability. ' 12 5 We are among the many who would have doubts.
125. Galanter, supra note 15 at 1273-74.
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